Cybersecurity risk assessment under the Cyber Resilience Act
6 min read
The manufacturer's obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act start with the assessment of cybersecurity risks. It determines which requirements of Annex I apply to your product and how you implement them. This guide shows what the assessment must contain, when you update it and where it belongs.
What it is about
Anyone placing a product with digital elements on the market must ensure that it has been designed, developed and produced in accordance with the essential cybersecurity requirements in Annex I Part I (Art. 13(1)). To that end, the manufacturer assesses the cybersecurity risks associated with the product (Art. 13(2)).
The outcome feeds into every phase: planning, design, development, production, delivery and maintenance. The aim is to minimise cybersecurity risks, prevent incidents and minimise their impact, including in relation to the health and safety of users.
These obligations apply from 11 December 2027 (Art. 71(2)). Manufacturers should also release pre-release versions such as alpha or beta versions only following a risk assessment (recital 37).
Source: Art. 13(1) and (2) CRA · Art. 71(2) CRA · Recital 37 CRA
What the assessment must contain
Art. 13(3) sets a minimum content. The assessment comprises:
- an analysis of cybersecurity risks based on the intended purpose and reasonably foreseeable use, as well as the conditions of use, such as the operational environment or the assets to be protected,
- taking into account the length of time the product is expected to be in use,
- an indication of whether and how the security requirements of Annex I Part I point (2) are applicable and how they are implemented as informed by the assessment,
- an indication of how the manufacturer is to apply Annex I Part I point (1) and the vulnerability handling requirements of Annex I Part II.
The assessment is documented (Art. 13(3)). Art. 13 and Annex VII do not prescribe a particular method or scale.
According to the Commission's guidelines, risks from outside the product also belong in the assessment, for example from external networks or infrastructure. The manufacturer does not have to control that environment, but must mitigate the risks through measures in the product itself. Components sourced from third parties are considered as well. In addition, the separate due diligence obligation for integrating third-party components applies (Art. 13(5)).
Source: Art. 13(3) and (5) CRA · Commission guidance C/2026/6013, points 167, 168, 172
How it relates to Annex I
Annex I Part I point (2) lists thirteen requirements on the properties of the product (points (a) to (m)). They apply “on the basis of the cybersecurity risk assessment” and “where applicable”. They include, for example:
- no known exploitable vulnerabilities when made available (a),
- a secure by default configuration (b) and vulnerabilities addressed through security updates (c),
- protection from unauthorised access (d) and confidentiality and integrity of data (e, f),
- data minimisation (g) and availability of essential functions (h),
- limited attack surfaces (j), recording of security-relevant activity (l) and secure deletion of all data and settings (m).
Annex I Part I point (1) requires, in general terms, an appropriate level of cybersecurity based on the risks. According to the guidelines, point (1) covers the risks that the other requirements do not adequately address. Where all relevant risks are covered through the other requirements, point (1) is deemed to be fulfilled.
Part II is different: manufacturers should comply with the vulnerability handling requirements throughout the support period. Which requirements on product properties are relevant is determined through the risk assessment (recital 54).
Source: Annex I Part I points (1) and (2) CRA · Recital 54 CRA · Commission guidance C/2026/6013, points 164 to 166
Justifying requirements that do not apply
Where an essential requirement is not applicable to the product, the manufacturer includes a clear justification in the technical documentation (Art. 13(4)). According to recital 55, it belongs in the risk assessment. An example given there: the intended purpose requires widely recognised interoperability standards whose security features are no longer state of the art.
If the manufacturer has nevertheless identified risks in relation to such a requirement, it should address them by other means. It may, for instance, limit the intended purpose to trusted environments or inform users about the risks. The guidelines add: document the constraints, assess the risks, implement compensating measures and periodically check whether the constraint still exists.
Risks cannot be eliminated entirely. According to the guidelines, however, residual risk is not measured against internal risk appetite but against whether the product achieves an appropriate level of cybersecurity. Cost alone does not justify leaving risks untreated. According to the guidelines, the Regulation does not provide for shifting risks to users to compensate for shortcomings in design.
Source: Art. 13(4) CRA · Recital 55 CRA · Commission guidance C/2026/6013, points 32, 157 to 159, 161, 163
Part of the technical documentation
When placing the product on the market, the manufacturer includes the assessment in the technical documentation under Art. 31 and Annex VII (Art. 13(4)). Annex VII point 3 names it expressly, including how the requirements of Annex I Part I are applicable.
The technical documentation is drawn up before placing on the market (Art. 13(12), Art. 31(2)). For products under Art. 12 (high-risk AI systems) that are also subject to other Union legal acts, the assessment may be part of the risk assessment required by those acts (Art. 13(4)).
Product families: where variants share the same architecture, security-relevant design and intended purpose and face the same risks, the guidelines allow a single risk assessment. Differences, for example in communication interfaces, software stacks, update mechanisms or remote connectivity, must be reflected in the assessment.
Source: Art. 13(4) and (12) CRA · Annex VII point 3 CRA · Art. 31(2) CRA · Art. 12 CRA · Commission guidance C/2026/6013, points 174 to 177
When to update it
The assessment is documented and updated as appropriate during the support period (Art. 13(3)). Art. 13(7) also requires relevant cybersecurity aspects to be documented systematically and in proportion to the risks. These include vulnerabilities the manufacturer becomes aware of and relevant information provided by third parties. Where applicable, the assessment is then updated.
The guidelines name triggers: a software update introduces new threat vectors, enables new attack scenarios or materially alters the likelihood or impact of existing scenarios. The manufacturer should then reassess the risks. The assessment and technical documentation must stay up to date whether or not an update is a substantial modification. A new variant with new risks also requires an update.
The initial assessment is also the benchmark for a substantial modification. Where a software update modifies the intended purpose in a way not foreseen in the initial assessment, or changes the nature of the hazard or increases the risk, recital 39 considers the product substantially modified once the updated version is made available on the market.
Source: Art. 13(3) and (7) CRA · Art. 31(2) CRA · Recital 39 CRA · Commission guidance C/2026/6013, points 112, 113, 177
In practice
The following points are our own recommendations, not requirements of the Regulation.
- Start with intended purpose, foreseeable use, operational environment, assets to be protected and expected time in use. Everything else builds on this.
- Structure the assessment by Annex I: for each of points (a) to (m), either the implementation or the reason it does not apply. Add point (1) and Part II.
- Keep the risks in a table with cause, affected security objective, measure and residual risk.
- You are free to choose the scale. One example, not a requirement of the Regulation: likelihood and impact each from 1 to 4, their product gives the level (up to 3 low, up to 6 medium, up to 9 high, above that critical). What matters is that you describe the method and apply it consistently.
- Set fixed triggers for review: every release, every new vulnerability in a component, information from third parties and every new variant.
- Archive every version with date and version number. That keeps it clear what applied when the product was placed on the market.
Related guides
- Product and evidenceTechnical documentation under the Cyber Resilience Act7 min read
- Product and evidenceSupport period under the Cyber Resilience Act: at least five years?3 min read
- Product and evidenceSubstantial modification: when does an update make a new product?7 min read
- Product and evidenceWhat is an SBOM? Obligations under the Cyber Resilience Act3 min read
- Product and evidenceEU declaration of conformity under the Cyber Resilience Act4 min read
- Product and evidenceAnnex I CRA: the essential cybersecurity requirements10 min read
Terms in the Cyber Resilience Act glossary
Sources
- Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, Art. 12, 13, 31, 71, Annex I, VII, recitals 37, 39, 54, 55 (EUR-Lex, Official Journal)
- Commission guidance C/2026/6013, OJ C, 17 Nov 2026, not binding
Status of the Commission guidance: the Commission approved its content on 27 July 2026 (C(2026) 5252). On 17 November 2026 the guidance was published in the Official Journal as Communication C/2026/6013, in all official languages. According to our comparison, the point numbers have not changed. The guidance is not binding, but it shows how the Commission reads the Regulation (as of 11/2026).
First published 6 Nov 2026, last updated 6 Nov 2026. This guide reflects the wording of the regulation and the Commission’s guidelines and does not constitute legal advice.